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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
-00O00-

GARY STEWART EGAN,
Plaintiff-Respondent
and Cross Appellant,
Case No. 14522

vs.
NANCY LEE EGAN,
Defendant-Appellant
and Cross Appellee.
-00O00-

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS APPELLANT
-ooOooSTATEMENT OF CASE
1.

IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES
(1) The Plaintiff below in this action, GARY S. EGAN, is

the Respondent and Cross Appellant on this appeal.

GARY S.

EGAN was the Defendant in the case of Nancy Lee Egan v.
Gary S. Egan, Docket No. D-14489, a divorce action filed in
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, a case to which the present case is corollary.
(2) The Defendant below in this action, NANCY LEE EGAN,
is the Appellant and Cross Appellee on this appeal.

NANCY

LEE EGAN was the Plaintiff in the divorce action of Nancy
Lee Egan v. Gary S. Egan (cited supra).

2.

NATURE OF THE ACTION
This appeal arises from a judgment entered following a

trial before the Civil Division of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., District Judge, presiding,
wherein GARY S. EGAN brought an INDEPENDENT ACTION pursuant
to Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for relief
from a default judgment entered in Civil Action D-14489, a
divorce case.

The Trial Court found in favor of Plaintiff

GARY S. EGAN (Respondent here) and entered judgment granting
only partial relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6)&(7) U.R.C.P.
from the prior Divorce Decree.

From that final order, the

Defendant below, NANCY LEE EGAN, appeals and the Plaintiff
below, GARY S. EGAN, cross-appeals.
3.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND CROSS APPEAL.
(1) On Appeal:
Whether the Trial Court erred in granting
partial relief from the prior judgment.
(2) On Cross Appeal:
Whether the Trial Court erred in failing
to grant complete relief from the default
judgment as sought by the Plaintiff below.
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
On November 5, 197 5, Plaintiff-Respondent GARY S. EGAN's

Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. Independent Action For Relief From Judgment came on for non-jury trial before the Civil Division of the Third Judicial District Court in and for
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Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin,
District Judge, presiding.

Plaintiff-Respondent GARY S. EGAN

sought relief from a default Divorce Decree made and entered
on September 11, 1974 by the Domestic Relations Division of
the same district in Civil Action D-14489, Honorable Peter F.
Leary, District Judge, presiding.

After a two-and-one-half

day trial and the parties having concluded their evidence,
the Trial Court requested counsel to submit Memoranda of
Points and Authorities on various issues of law raised
during trial.
On January 20, 1976, after a series of post-trial motions
and oral arguments, the Trial Court entered Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, finding that the underlying SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT entered into between the parties (dated
September 14, 1974)(R.3) was void by reason that it was
based upon an erroneous assumption and mutual mistake of fact
(i.e. that the child Melinda Sarah Egan was his biological
child, when in fact she was not.) (Findings of Fact 1(17) (R. 135)
(Conclusions of Law 1[2)(R.136)
Accordingly, on January 20, 197 6, the Trial Court entered
a judgment granting only partial relief from the prior
Divorce Decree relieving the Plaintiff GARY S. EGAN from
the further support of the child MELINDA SARAH EGAN and deleting all reference to the child from the Divorce Decree.
From that judgment, NANCY LEE EGAN appeals and GARY S. EGAN
cross appeals.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant NANCY LEE EGAN seeks a reversal of the
Trial Court's judgment granting partial relief from judgment
requesting this Court to reinstate the terms of the original
Divorce Decree requiring GARY S. EGAN to support the child
MELINDA SARAH EGAN-

The Respondent and Cross Appellant

GARY S. EGAN seeks:
(1) an equitable review of both the facts and
the law pursuant to Rule 72(a) U.R.C.P.;
(2) that the Court set aside the entire Decree
of Divorce, except for that portion dissolving
the marriage; and
(3) for an order remanding the divorce action
to the Domestic Relations Division for trial
upon the merits.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
GARY S. EGAN and NANCY LEE EGAN were married to each
other on November 18, 1964 in Salt Lake City, Utah

(R.13).

The marriage lasted some nine and one half years; one child,
Allison Egan, age 11, was born the legitimate issue of the
marriage (R.6).

In early May of 1974, the parties separ-

ated and on May 28, 1974 NANCY LEE EGAN filed a Complaint
for absolute divorce.

Although living separately, both

parties testified to having sexual relations together
during the month of June 1974 (TR.25&76).

The Defendant

NANCY LEE EGAN also testified that she had sexual relations
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with another man, not her husband, during the month of June
1974 (TR.77-78).

In July of 1974, NANCY LEE EGAN learned

that she was pregnant with another child and filed an Affidavit with the Court dated August 5, 1974 stating that:
"Another child to be born of the marriage is expected in
February 1975." (TR.82 & Plaintiff's Ex. 11). NANCY LEE EGAN
informed the Plaintiff GARY S. EGAN that the unborn child
was his child and there is no conflict in the testimony that
she reassured him of the fact that the expected child was in
fact his child on a number of subsequent occasions (TR.30,
55,62,69,70,102,104,108).

The parties discussed reconcilia-

tion and settlement throughout the month of August and the
first half of September 1974; however, on September 16, 1974,
based upon NANCY EGAN ! s representations as to the paternity
of the unborn child, GARY EGAN entered into a STIPULATION &
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (R.16) and signed an APPEARANCE AND
CONSENT TO DEFAULT so that the divorce could proceed by
default and without contest (TR.6, Ex.P-10).

Thereafter on

September 19, 1974, the Court approved the STIPULATION &
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT and entered default judgment and final
Decree of Divorce based upon and in accordance with its
terms (R.6-23).
On or about September 20, 1974, immediately after NANCY's
Court appearance on the default divorce and after the final
Decree had been entered,

NANCY and GARY EGAN went to lunch

—^The divorce became final upon entry of the Decree (R.6,^1)
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together at Auerbach's tea room (TR.43).

During lunch, NANCY

EGAN informed GARY EGAN for the first time of the possibility
that the child then in gestation may not be his (TR.38,42,43) .
GARY EGAN testified that he was not certain of her motives for
telling him this, but when the child was born on March 28, 1975
and he had an opportunity to observe the child, he became
convinced for the first time that the infant Melinda Sarah
Egan was in fact not his child (R.61).

Immediately thereafter

GARY EGAN contacted Dr. Charles D. Scott, Medical Geneticist,
for expert advice as to the determination of paternity.

Dr.

Scott suggested GARY retain legal counsel without delay.

EGAN

did so and on June 30, 1975, an independent action was brought
for relief from judgment in accordance with Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P.
(R.l).

At trial upon the merits two of the three blood group

examinations ordered by the Court prior to trial were admitted
into evidence, both of which positively excluded GARY STEWART
EGAN from paternity (R.132).

The two blood tests admitted at

trial were conducted pursuant to Plaintiff's motion under
§ 78-25-18 Utah Code Annotated (1953)(R.70), the one remaining
test conducted upon Defendant's motion was not offered by her
counsel at time of trial (TR.86).

Based upon extrinsic evi-

dence in accordance with Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 518
P.2d 687 (1974), the Court thereupon made the finding that
the child Melinda Sarah Egan was not the natural and biological child of the Plaintiff GARY S. EGAN nor the legitimate
issue of the marriage (Finding of Fact 1(4 and Conclusion of
Law H3, R.132).
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Although the Trial Court did find that the child Melinda
Sarah Egan was conclusively proved, beyond a reasonable
doubt, not to be the child of GARY S. EGAN, the Court found
that the representations of paternity made by NANCY LEE EGAN
to GARY S. EGAN did not constitute fraud, but were made under
a mistaken belief and upon an erroneous assumption (Conclusion
of Law 1(2, R.136) .
Accordingly, the Court found that the Contract or SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT entered into by the parties (dated September
16, 1974) was based upon a mutual mistake of fact and the
erroneous assumption that the child Melinda S. Egan (born
after the divorce became final) was the child of the Plaintiff GARY S. EGAN; and that the AGREEMENT OF SETTLEMENT was
therefore void or voidable (Finding of Fact 1(17, R.135).
Based upon the finding that the underlying Contract or AGREEMENT
OF SETTLEMENT was void, the Court granted partial rescission
of the Agreement and entered a judgment granting partial relief from the future application of the judgment (viz. the
support terms of the judgment) pursuant to Rule 60(b) (6)&(7) ,
the Court finding that it was no longer equitable that the
judgment have prospective application

(R.139).

On appeal, the Defendant NANCY LEE EGAN claims in the
absence of an express finding of fraud on her part the Trial
Court erred in granting the Plaintiff partial relief from a
judgment requiring the support of a child even though the
child is admittedly not the child of GARY EGAN-
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The

Plaintiff GARY S. EGAN contends the Court's action was not an
abuse of discretion, but asserts the entire Agreement was based
upon a false and erroneous assumption that the child was his
and that NANCY had been a true and faithful wife, that the entire Agreement should be set aside and the entire matter should
be remanded to the Family Relations Division for hearing, the
matter not having been previously litigated as the Divorce
Decree was taken by default.
RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT ON APPELLANT'S APPEAL
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT IS VESTED WITH BROAD DISCRETION IN GRANTING
RULE 60(b) (5) (6)&(7) RELIEF AND THE COURT'S JUDGMENT WAS NOT
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
At the outset it should be noted that the Appellant
NANCY LEE EGAN made no claim at trial and makes no claim
on this appeal that the child MELINDA SARAH EGAN is the child
of GARY S. EGAN.

She does admit that she misled him during

settlement negotiation (TR.108) but contends that because
he did not discover that the child was not his child before
three months had elapsed, that he should be responsible for
the lifetime support of another man's child.
Such a contention before a court of equity seems incredible if not preposterous.

Why she does not seek support from

the child's real father is not known, but in all events, that
question is not before the Court on this appeal.
1.

Relief under Rule 60(b) is not limited to three

months under the sections applicable here.
In Points I & II of pages 7 and 9 of NANCY LEE EGAN's
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Brief, the Appellant advances the argument that the three
month limitation on bringing a Rule 60(b) motion under subsections (1),(2),(3)&(4) somehow prevents a party from being
entitled to relief under subsections 60(b) (5) (6)& (7) in the
event the party seeking the relief from judgment should also
bring an Independent Action for relief as prescribed in
Rule 60(b).
The complete text of Rule 60(b) reads as follows:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect;
Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud; Etc, On motion
and upon such terms as are just, the court may in
the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order
or proceeding for the following reasons (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence
could not have been discovered in time to move for
a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse
party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an
action has not been personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant
has failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied,
released or discharged, or a prior judgment has
been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is not longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment. The motion
shall be made within a reasonable time and for
reasons (1),(2),(3), or (4), not more than 3 months
after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered
or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation. This rule does not limit the power of a
court to entertain an independent action to relieve
a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or
by an independent action. Id. Rule 60(b) (Emphasis
Supplied)
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It is clear from a reading of the Rule that there is no
time limitation on relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5)(6)or(7),
nor is there any time limitation upon bringing an Independent
Action other than "within a reasonable time".

Appellant's

position, if it is understood correctly, is that a moving
party cannot bring one single action seeking relief from
judgment under 60(b)(5)(6)or(7) if "fraud upon the court"
is one of his legal theories, but must instead bring two
separate actions, i.e. one by motion under subsections (5),
(6)&(7) in the original proceeding and a second by way of
Independent Action in a totally separate proceeding or suit in
equity.
Under Appellant's theory, the party seeking relief would
have to duplicate legal expenses, witness, testimony, experts,
evidence, legal argument, etc. in each action.
Such a duplicative procedure would indeed be a novel
approach to litigation, as usually the courts are concerned
with such items as time, expense and efficient utilization
of judicial resources, etc.
There is no question but that an action sounding in fraud
upon the Court under Rule 60(b) must be brought in an Independent Action, but nothing in the language of the Rule suggests a limitation on a party's ability to seek relief under
alternative theories pursuant to subsections 60(b) (5) (6)& (7)
at the same time and in the same action.
In fact, the language of the Rule stated in the disjunctive "or" rather than in the conjunctive "and" suggests
exactly the

opposite, for example, the last two lines of
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Rule 60(b) read as follows:
"This rule does not limit the power of a court to
entertain an independent action to relieve a party
from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment
shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or
by an independent action." (Emphasis added)
The use of the disjunctive word "or" suggests that after
the initial three month limitation has past, an action for
relief from judgment under subsections (5)(6)&(7) may be
brought either by motion in the original action or together
with other equitable theories in a Separate Suit In Equity
under the Rule 60(b) "Independent Action" clause.
Justice Ellett's concurring opinion in McGavin v. McGavin,
27 Utah 2d 200, 494 P.2d 283 (1972) as well as the Court's
unanimous decision in Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 222, 341
P.2d 949 (1959) lead one to conclude that after the three
month period has expired, a party would most prudently bring
his Rule 60(b) action for relief from judgment by way of a
Separate Suit In Equity.

Rule 60 (b) (5) (6)& (7) being the

equitable provisions of the Rule, (see Warren v. Dixon Ranch,
123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741,742 (1953)), it seems only sensible that all equitable claims be joined in the same action
rather than instituting two different actions at the same
time.
POINT II
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH HAS ON AT LEAST FIVE
PREVIOUS OCCASIONS SUSTAINED RULE 60(b) RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT
BASED UPON "MISTAKE OF FACT" OR "ERRONEOUS ASSUMPTION" LONG
AFTER THE THREE MONTH LIMITATION HAD EXPIRED.
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This Court is currently considering the question of
whether the Trial Court erred in granting Plaintiff GARY
STEWART EGAN relief from the "prospective application" of
the default judgment ordering him to pay $125.00 per month
for the support of a child Melinda Egan, a child which the
Trial Court positively determined not to be the child of the
Plaintiff.

Plaintiff contended that the judgment was based

upon fraud, mistake or the "erroneous assumption" on the
part of all parties that the child was the child of the
parties when in fact subsequent events proved that it is not.
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the relief granted pursuant to
Rules 60(b) (6)&(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which
provide as follows:
"The court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party . . . from a final judgment . . •
for the following reasons:
(6) . . . it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment." (Emphasis supplied)
The Appellant NANCY LEE EGAN, by her Brief, would have
this Court believe that either the Trial Court did not have
such power or that the provisions of Section 60(b) (6)& (7) are
inapposite to the case presently at Bar.

Appellant's Brief

cites selected Utah cases decided under Rule 60(b) and then
alludes to cases decided under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for support.

As a reading of the cases cited in Ap-

pellant's Brief discloses/there is nothing even remotely
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bearing upon the issue now before the Court; however, at the
outset, one important distinction should be noted: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide a time period of one year
from entry of judgment in which to bring a motion for relief
from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) (1), (2), (3)& (4), Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, whereas the Utah Rules require
that such a Motion be brought within three months from date
of judgment; furthermore, the Federal Courts do not become
involved in domestic relations law.

For these two reasons,

the equitable considerations involved between the State and
Federal Courts are quite different.
This Brief shall concern itself strictly and exclusively
with the law of the State of Utah and decided only under
Rule 60(b) (6)&(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
particularly focus upon judgments that were entered based
upon "erroneous assumptions" or predicated upon a defective
understanding of the attendant facts.

These cases unques-

tionably stand for the proposition that Rule 60(b) (6)& (7)
is a broad grant of equitable power which is given to the
District Court in order to interdict an otherwise unjust or
unconscionable result brought about by reason of a prior
and final judgment.
The first case on point of Stewart v. Sullivan, 29 Utah
2d 156, 506 P.2d 74 (1973) is a case that does appear in the
annotations of the Utah Code immediately following Rule 60(b),
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but which was left out of Appellant's scholarly summary of
cases.

In Stewart, Plaintiff's counsel mistakenly believed

that he had answered Defendant's Interrogatories, when in
fact he had not.

Consequently, Plaintiff's Complaint was

dismissed with prejudice under Rule 37 for failure to make
discovery.

Some thirteen months later, Plaintiff retained

new counsel and moved the Trial Court to grant relief from
the thirteen month old Judgment of Dismissal with prejudice
and to modify said judgment to provide for dismissal without
prejudice in order that a new action could be filed.

Judge

Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. granted the motion for relief from
judgment and modified the existing order and the Defendant
appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.

In sustaining the Trial

Court's granting of relief from prior judgment and subsequent
modification of the order, the Utah Supreme Court held per
Justice Tuckett:
"The provisions of Rule 60(b)(7) are sufficiently
broad to permit the Court to set aside its former
order which appeared to have been entered upon an
'erroneous assumption' and to enter a new order
based upon the record before it." (Emphasis Supplied) (Id. at 506 P.2d 76.)
A second Utah case (involving an erroneous assumption)
not mentioned in Appellant's Brief is Kelly v. Scott, 5 Utah
2d 159, 298 P.2d 821 (1956).

In the Kelly case, a real estate

broker sued a seller for his real estate commission earned
in connection with the sale of the seller's house and took
judgment against the seller.

Some eleven months later the

seller sued the purchaser of the house for failure to perform
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the sales agreement.

The Trial Court determined the real es-

tate sales contract to be void and unenforceable by reason of
a failure of a condition precedent.

The Trial Court then on

motion of the seller granted him relief from the eleven month
old judgment in favor of the real estate broker because the
judgment had been entered upon the "erroneous assumption"
that there was in existence a valid and enforceable real estate sales contract, when in fact, there was not.

The real

estate broker, on a subsequent motion to the Trial Court,
persuaded the Court, Judge Ellett, to reinstate the judgment
for his sales commission.

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court

reversed the Trial Court,holding:
"It is clear that the judgment for the [broker]
• • • was predicated on the belief by both
parties before the court that an enforceable
contract between the [purchasers] and [sellers]
existed. Under these circumstances, the Judgment
should have been vacated in its entirety pursuant to the motion made by Appellant in accordance with Rule 60(b)(6) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure . . ." Id. at 298 P.2d 823. [Emphasis
Supplied]
In Ney v. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 115 (1956),
a divorced husband and wife were sued by (the assignee of)
a real estate broker for a sales commission earned in
selling their apartment house.

The wife erroneously be-

lieved that her husband had the responsibility of defending
her in the action and failed to answer.

Subsequently, a

default judgment was taken against her.

Some eleven months

later she moved the Court for relief from the judgment and
the Trial Court set the judgment aside.
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On appeal, the

Utah Supreme Court through Justice Crockett affirmed the Trial
Court's granting relief from judgment eleven months later and
held:
"Defendant did not request relief until nearly 11
months had elapsed and hence, the only applicable
section of Rule 60(b) upon which she could rely
was (7). [Defendant's] motion was supported by
an affidavit in which the major ground for relief
was that she had mistakenly believed that she was
fully protected by a divorce decree ordering her
ex-husband to pay any real estate commission
arising from the sale of the apartments.
Plaintiff argues that this is a mistake of law
and not within the purview of Rule 60(b) . . .
The trial court could well record this as among
the class of cases that Rule 60(b)(7) was intended to govern and to permit [Defendant] to
justify her failure to answer on the ground that
the divorce decree required her husband to bear
the obligation and required him to defend the
action for her. Id. at 299 P.2d 1116" [Emphasis
supplied]
In the Utah case of Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 P.2d
1211 (1952), the parties to a divorce action stipulated to
the entry of a temporary order.

Several months later, one

of the counsel for the parties "erroneously believing" that
the stipulation was a final one prepared a Final Order in
accordance with the Stipulation and had it entered by the
Court.

The Plaintiff moved for relief from the Judgment

after the three month motion period had expired.

The

Trial Court granted relief to the Plaintiff pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(7) and the Defendant appealed.

The Supreme Court

affirmed and held:
"The record . . . clearly indicates that the
signing and entry of such formal Order was
done upon the "erroneous assumption" that it
conformed to a direction of the Court . . .
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In light of the allegations of Plaintiffs petition
requesting that it be set aside, it would work
upon her a grave injustice to permit the order
to stand. Under Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P., a Judgment
or Order may be set aside for any reason other
than those specified in reasons 1 to 6 "Justifying Relief From the Operation of The Judgment"
if the motion is made within a reasonable time . . .
Furthermore, in the absence of a rule to that
effect the court perhaps had an inherent power
to set the former order aside. See, In Re Evans,
42 Utah 282, 130 p. 217." (Id. at 240 P.2d 1213,
14.) (Emphasis Supplied)
The Dixon v. Dixon case clearly demonstrates the breadth
of the Court's equitable power in the last line of the case
quoted.
Finally, the case of Warren v. Dixon Ranch, 123 Utah 416,
260 P.2d 741, 742 (1953) carefully outlines the equitable
power and discretion of the Court in granting relief from
unjust, unfair or inequitable judgments.

In Dixon Ranch,

the Court per Justice McDonough stated with respect to
Rule 60(b):
"The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a
creature of equity designed to relieve against the
harshness of enforcing a judgment, which may
occur through procedural difficulties, the
wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes
which prevent the presentation of a claim or
defense. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure outlines the situations wherein a
party may be relieved from a final judgment,
among which is mistake, inadvertence, surprise,
or excusable neglect claimed hereby the appellant. Equity considers factors which may
be irrelevant in actions at law, such as the
unfairness of a party's conduct, his delay in
bringing or continuing the action, the hardship
in granting or denying relief. Although an
equity court no longer has complete discretion
in granting or denying relief it may exercise
wide judicial discretion in weighing the factors
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of fairness and public convenience, and this court
on appeal will reverse the trial court only where
an abuse of this discretion is clearly shown.
Salt Lake Hardware Co. v. Nielson Land & Water Co.,
43 Utah 406 f 134 P. 911; McWhirter v. Donaldson,
36 Utah 293, 104 P. 731."
From a brief survey of the Utah cases turning upon the
issue of relief from prior judgments pursuant to Rule 60(b)
(6)&(7), U.R.C.P., two concrete conclusions can be drawn:
1.

Rule 60(b) (6)&(7) are a broad and plenary

grant of equitable power which enables the Court
to do whatever it deems necessary to do justice
between the parties; and
2.

whatever decision the Trial Court comes to

with respect to granting or withholding relief
from judgment will not usually be disturbed by
the Supreme Court on Appeal, except where a clear
abusive discretion is shown.
Applying the law announced in the above cited cases to the
facts of the Egan case, the case at Bar, some undisputed
premises can be stated.
1.

The child Melinda Sarah Egan is not the bio-

logical offspring of the Plaintiff GARY EGAN.(R.134,K4&136K3)
2.

The Plaintiff GARY EGAN has paid

some $1,87 5.00 in child support for the child
to date, plus he has been ordered to pay an
additional $900.00 in hospital bills incurred
by reason of the child's birth. (R.7)
3.

Unless this Court sustains the prospective

relief from the future application of this
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judgment granted by the Trial Court, GARY EGAN will
pay NANCY EGAN $27,000.00 over the next 18 years
as child support for a child that is not his. (R.6&7)
4.

The Trial Court, pursuant to a separate suit

in equity for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b),
has found on the basis of equity that EGAN is entitled to relief from the future application of
judgment.
5.

(R.137)

The Stipulation, Waiver and Consent to Default

was made and entered upon mistaken belief or erroneous assumption of fact that the child was his
biological offspring
6.

(TR.120).

At the time the Stipulation and Consent to

Default were entered, EGAN had no opportunity to
learn the true facts and no opportunity to learn
the true facts was available until March 28, 1975
when the child was born, which was six months
after the Divorce Decree was entered.
7.

(TR.82)

EGAN brought his action for relief from judg-

ment within nine months after entry of the Decree
and within three months after the child was born
and it first became possible to take a blood sample
from the child in order to determine true paternity*
It is respectfully submitted that the District Courts
of the State of Utah have granted,and the Supreme Court on
Appeal has affirmed, relief from the future application of a
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final judgment in cases much less egregious than the EGAN
case.

"Mistaken belief" or "erroneous assumption" has served

as a basis for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) (6)& (7)
in at least five prior Utah cases cited above in this Respondent's Brief; to~wit:
Where the parties believed a contract to be valid and enforceable when in fact it was not, the Supreme Court affirmed
60(b)(6) relief from judgment 11 months later.

Kelly v. Scott,

supra.
Where the lawyer for a party mistakenly believed he had
answered interrogatories, the Supreme Court affirmed 60(b)(7)
relief 13 months later.

Stewart v. Sullivan, supra.

Where a woman erroneously believed her husband would defend an action for her, the Court granted 60(b)(7) relief 11
months later.

Ney v. Harrison, supra.

Where a temporary Stipulation & Settlement Agreement was
mistaken for a final one, the Court sustained Rule 60(b)
relief granted 9 months later.

Dixon v. Dixon, supra, etc.

Certainly, if those cases constitute a sufficient basis
for Rule 60(b) (6)& (7) relief from judgment, an error in belief or erroneous assumption as substantial as the paternity
or non-paternity of a child and the responsibility for its
lifetime support is a much stronger reason to grant relief
indeed.
The Plaintiff EGAN requests the Court to consider the
equities attendant in the present action and sustain the
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relief granted by the Trial Court from the future or "prospective application of judgment" under Rule 60(b)(6) or for
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of
judgment" under Rule 60(b)(7).
To deny EGAN relief and allow the judgment based on error
to stand will not do justice between the parties and will
bring about an unconscionable and unjust result that will
continue for the next 17 years.
POINT III
ALL ISSUES UPON WHICH THE COURT BASED ITS DECISION WERE RAISED
IN THE PLEADINGS AND ALL ISSUES WERE TRIED WITH THE FULL KNOWLEDGE, CONSENT AND PARTICIPATION OF THE APPELLANT.
1.

The issue of negligent misrepresentation or mistaken

misrepresentation was raised in the pleadings.
The Appellant's Brief at Point III claims error by reason
that the Trial Court failed to grant relief on the basis of
fraud, but instead bottomed its judgment upon erroneous assumption and mutual mistake of fact.

The Appellant claims

that the issue of mistake was never raised in the pleadings
and that he had no opportunity to meet and defend against such
an issue during time of the trial.
finds no basis in fact.

Appellant's contention

Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure requires: "a short, plain statement of the claim
showing the pleader is entitled to relief."
The Plaintiff's original verified Complaint filed in this
action in the second opening paragraph states: 2. "That this
Action for Relief from judgment . . .
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is brought pursuant to

and in accordance with Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure." (R.l at \\2)

In paragraph 12 of Plaintiff's Com-

plaint, Plaintiff set forth that one of the bases of his
claim for relief from judgment was the "negligent misrepresentation of a material fact," (R.3,^12)
Rule 60(b) contains seven subsections upon which relief
can be granted which include:
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, etc.;
(2) newly discovered evidence etc.;
(3) fraud . . . misrepresentation or other
misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) when . . . the summons in an action has
not been personally served upon the defendant etc. ;
(5) the judgment is void;
(6) the judgment has been satisfied . . . or
it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or
(7) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment.
The Defendant was certainly on notice of what issues were
to be raised and litigated at time of trial as they were set
forth with great detail in the Complaint.
Secondly, the Plaintiff, in accordance with the strict
requirement of Rule 9(b) U.R.C.P. set forth and plead the
issue of fraud with "particularity" as defined in Pace v.
Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1953), all other claims
were averred generally. [See 1[11 (1) through (9) ]
One can scarcely conceive of any more simple and
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plain statement of what the Plaintiff intended to allege,
raise and prove at trial.
A negligent misrepresentation of a material fact is a
false statement of fact based not upon a conscious intention
to deceive, but upon a mistake or erroneous assumption about
the true state of the facts.

PROSSER, The Law of Torts, 3d

ed. § 100 misrepresentation and mistake P. 701 (1964).
Finally, at the conclusion of trial, the Court requested
counsel for each of the parties to submit memoranda of law
on several points, one of the points requested by the Trial
Court was whether the Court could grant relief from judgment
on a showing of anything less than actionable fraud (R.84,
101,107).

Defendant's counsel was given notice and oppor-

tunity to brief and argue the point prior to judgment on
that occasion as well.
2.

The Appellant has failed to demonstrate what evidence

or points were not adduced by reason of the Court's finding
of mistake instead of fraud.
The Appellant contends she was not able to meet or defend against the issue of mistaken misrepresentation or erroneous assumption at time of trial; however, no mention is
made of the manner in which she was prejudiced, what evidence
was not heard by the Court, how the trial would have been
conducted differently, or how a different result might have
been reached.
Negligent misrepresentation or mistaken representation of
material fact is certainly a lesser included element of an
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allegation of fraud lacking only the requirement of a conscious intention.

PROSSER, The Law of Torts, 3d. ed. § 100

misrepresentation and mistake (1964).
Surely it cannot be seriously contended that NANCY EGAN
was not grossly mistaken when she assured GARY EGAN on numerous
occasions (TR.30,55,62,69,70,102,104,108) that the child to
be born was his child.

The Court found absolutely without

question that it was not his child and Appellant does not
even now contend that it is.

NANCY EGAN herself testified

that she told GARY EGAN the child was his because she thought
it was (R.108).

That statement, being admittedly false, if

not conscious fraud, can only then be a mistake.
Finally, for the sake of examining Appellant f s argument
only, how could NANCY EGAN have testified differently, given
that Plaintiff sought rescission by reason of honest mistake
rather than intentional fraud.

What possible different

questions could have been asked of GARY EGAN on crossexamination to defend against an allegation of mistaken
belief rather than intentional deceit.

There is no alle-

gation that a mistake had not, in fact been made, but only
that Defendant would have conducted her case differently
to defend

against mistake as opposed to fraud.

The Ap-

pellant has not, however, advised the Court how the evidence
would have been different or what evidence for this reason did not
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come to light.

The Appellant does not quarrel with the facts

as the Court found them or allege they are different from the
Plaintiff's version/ but only that the defense of the case
would have been different, if NANCY EGAN had been defending
against a less difficult case for the Plaintiff to prove..
Appellant's argument seems a non sequitur for the reason that
it is.
ARGUMENT ON RESPONDENT'S CROSS APPEAL
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
THE RESPONDENT AND CROSS APPELLANT DID PROVE EACH AND EVERY
ELEMENT OF FRAUD AND IS ENTITLED TO RESCISSION OF THE ENTIRE
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND COMPLETE RELIEF FROM THE ENTIRE
DIVORCE DECREE.
This is not a case where the Appellant asks the Supreme
Court on appeal to retry the case on the record, to believe
the testimony of his witnesses and disbelieve the testimony
of the opponent's witnesses in contravention to the findings
of the Trial Court.

The Cross Appellant is well aware of the

futility of that approach periodically taken by disgruntled
litigants whose cases are replete throughout the reporting
system.

The Cross Appellant would not waste his time nor the

Court's with such an appeal.
This case is unique in that there are no facts or testimony in dispute.

The Trial Court was not faced with accepting

or rejecting the testimony of either party.

It did not have

to believe one party and disbelieve another as the evidence
was consistent in all respects.

The reason the Cross Appellant

seeks equitable review of both the law and the facts pursuant
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to Rule 72(a) U.R.C.P. is that as each and every element of
fraud was proved and no dispute in the testimony existed, the
Trial Court could not reasonably find any other way under
the present state of the case law; or in short, the Trial
Court could not reasonably draw the inferences that it did
given the state of the objective facts developed at trial.
The case of Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273
(1952) has long been the definitive case on the law of fraud
in the State of Utah.
Applying the nine elements set forth in Pace v. Parrish
to the undisputed facts of the case, the Respondent and Cross
Appellant requests that this Court on review see if it can
draw the same inferences and conclusions from the objective
and uncontroverted facts as did the Trial Court.
(1) That a representation was made;
No dispute on the representation, both parties
testified the same:

that NANCY LEE EGAN told GARY

S. EGAN that she was pregnant with a child in July
of 1974 and repeatedly assured him that the child
was his continuously from July through September
19, 1974 (TR.30,55,62,69,70,102,104,108).
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact;
No dispute in testimony here, both parties
testified to the same thing.

NANCY EGAN told GARY

EGAN she was then pregnant with his child (TR.30,
55,62,69,7 0,102,104,108).
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(3) which was false;
No dispute here.

The Trial Court found that the

child was positively not the child of GARY EGAN based
upon two separate blood tests (R.134 1(4, 136 1[3) .
(4) which the representator either
(a) Knew to be false, or
(b) made recklessly, knowing that she had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base
such representation.
No dispute in the testimony on this point.

NANCY testi-

fied at trial that during the month of June 1974, while she
was living apart from her husband, she had sexual relations
with another man, not her husband

(TR.77&78)

Moreover, thereafter on September 20, 1974, the day after
the Divorce Decree had been entered (the divorce became final
upon entry) NANCY told GARY for the very first time that she
did not know whose child it was that she was carrying (TR.43)
and that such knowledge was weighing heavily on her mind
(TR.43).
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other person to act
upon it;
There is no dispute on the issue of intention to induce
GARY EGAN to rely on NANCY ! s representations that Melinda
was GARY'S child, as under direct examination by her own
counsel, in answer to his question:
"What was the purpose of your telling Gary that
it was his child?"
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Answer:

"I don't understand."

"Why did you tell Gary he was the father of the child?"
Answer: "Because I thought Gary Egan was the father."
(TR.108)
(6) That the other party acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity;
No dispute that it is reasonable for man to believe his
wife when she tells him she is pregnant with his child;
moreover, not only GARY, BUT NANCY herself testified that
GARY EGAN had no way of knowing that the child was not his
child. (TR.83).

NANCY also testified that GARY seemed to

believe her when she told him the child was his (TR.83).
(7) did in fact rely upon it;
The proof that GARY EGAN relied upon NANCY f s statements
as to paternity is better than mere testimony, he signed an
AGREEMENT to pay $125.00 per month for eighteen years to
support the child (R.16).
(8) and was thereby induced to act;
No dispute that GARY acted by entering into the AGREEMENT
to pay his wife child support for the child to be born and to
pay the hospital bills incurred in connection with its birth
(R.16) or that he actually performed the terms of the AGREEMENT (TR.9,10&11).
(9) to his injury and damage;
It is undisputed that GARY EGAN has paid support for the
child of $1,800.00, paid all hospital expenses incurred in
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connection with the birth of $900.00, agreed to pay his
former wife $470.00 per month and given up his right to appear
in Court to contest the issues raised in the divorce complaint, all on the assumption that the child was his and he
had the responsibility for its support and maintenance. (TR.9-13)
The above cited paragraphs and citations to the transcript and record reflect the undisputed testimony at time
of trial.

This evidence is not controverted, the facts are

objective and both parties testified to the same thing;
nevertheless, the Trial Court found as follows:

That NANCY

LEE EGAN did not act recklessly knowing that she had insufficient knowledge and that GARY EGAN did not reasonably
rely upon her representations to him (Findings of Fact R.134).
The facts are not disputed, only the inferences drawn
from the facts by the Trial Court are challenged on this
appeal.
In all candor, can reasonable minds differ that if a woman
who admittedly had sexual intercourse with two men during
the same month and who felt the need to confess her deep concern over the paternity of the child to her husband the day
after the Divorce Decree was entered, did not that person
have the very same concerns the day before the Decree Wcis
entered when her husband questioned her specifically on the
very point of paternity.

And if she had such doubts about

paternity, did she not represent material facts to her husband
"upon insufficient knowledge to base such a representation",
in accordance with Element No. 4(b) of Pace v. Parrish, supra;
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The Trial Court's conclusion, that NANCY EGAN f s representations as to paternity were made for two months upon blithe
naivete1 up until the Decree was entered, and then suddenly
the very next day lightning struck and she realized for the
very first time that the child may not be her husband's, is
ridiculous.
The same kind of reasoning applies to the Court's finding
that GARY EGAN did not rely upon NANCY f s representations.
Actions speak much louder than words and GARY'S execution of
the SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT conclusively proves that he believed
NANCY and that he relied upon what she told him. Elsewise,
why would he have signed an AGREEMENT to pay $27,000.00.
If based upon the undisputed testimony of the parties,
GARY EGAN did not prove fraud and the Trial Court's conclusions drawn from the objective facts are sustained by this
Court on appeal, then fraud cannot be proved in Utah without
the admission of the party who perpetrated the fraud that he
specifically intended to defraud the individual injured.

It

is submitted that that is a case we shall never live to see.
This is a case where the facts as established at trial simply
do not support the Court's conclusions.
As stated, the Cross Appellant does not ask the reviewing
Court to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, to believe
his witnesses and disbelieve the witnesses of the Defendant.
On the contrary, he requests this Court to review the undisputed facts to see whether they square with the conclusions
drawn by the Trial Court.

It is respectfully submitted that

they do not.
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POINT V
THE PLAINTIFF GARY EGAN HAS PLEAD AND PROVED ACTIONABLE COMMON
LAW FRAUD ENTITLING HIM TO FULL RESCISSION ON THE AGREEMENT.
The Utah law is undisputed that the burden is upon the
Plaintiff to prove fraud by clear and convincing evidencef
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952).

The Utah

Supreme Court has refined the definition of clear and convincing in the case of C . L T . Credit Corp. v. Sohm, 15 Utah
2d 262, 391 P.2d 293 (1964) wherein the Court held:
Perhaps another way of stating the Rule is that it
must be proved by a clear preponderance of the
evidence. If it is clear and preponderates, presumably it is also convincing . . .
Id. at 294, P.2d 391
The general rule that fraud must be affirmatively proved
by a "clear preponderance of the evidence" does not mean that
fraud must be established in every case by direct evidence.
In most cases fraud is proved by reference to the circumstances and the legitimate inferences that may reasonably
be drawn therefrom; or as often stated, fraud may be inferred
from the circumstances of the transaction.

McQuire v. Corbett,

119, C.A. 2d 244, 259 P.2d 507 (1953); Zimmerman v. Loose,
162 Colo. 80, 425 P.2d 803 (1967); Carrel v. Lux, 101 Ariz.
430, 420 P.2d 564 (1966), 37 C.J.S., Fraud, §§ 94-115.
In the case at Bar several facts warrant mention here.
1.

At trial under examination by Plaintiff's counsel,

NANCY EGAN at first denied having sexual relations with any
other man besides GARY EGAN prior to the time she learned of
her pregnancy (TR.73).

However, later after conferring with
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her own counsel, the same question was put to NANCY EGAN a
second time, but this time by her own lawyer (TR.77).

The

second time the answer was different and she admitted having
had sex relations with another man.

When asked the name of

this individual, NANCY EGAN refused to answer the question
(TR.112); based upon the demeanor and apparent frankness and
candor of this witness, admittedly it is for the Trial Court
to determine whether or not that testimony is reliable or even
believable.

However, when the Appellant Court on Equitable

Review examines the law and the facts such points became relevant.
2.

NANCY EGAN herself testified that GARY EGAN inquired

on a number of occasions whether the child in gestation was
his child and she herself testified that she reassured him on
each and every occasion that the child was in fact his (TR.83).
Not until September 20, 1974 when the Order and Decree had
been safely entered did she mention to Plaintiff the possibility that the child was not his (TR.43).

Surely if she had

doubts on September 20, 1974 it is logical to assume that she
had the same doubts on September 18, 1974, the day before when
EGAN had signed the SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT and CONSENT TO DEFAULT.
This point is of primary significance as when GARY EGAN
asked NANCY if it were his child, she had a duty to disclose
any doubts she might harbor.

Since she did not disclose those

doubts to GARY EGAN before he signed but waited until the day
after the Decree was safely entered and the divorce was final,
it is strong evidence that she willingly, consciously and
knowingly concealed those facts from him and vitiates any inference or claim of "honest mistake."
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3.

Finally, NANCY EGAN consciously misled both the Court

and the Plaintiff when she filed her August 5, 1974 Affidavit
with the Court stating the child was due in February, when
in reality the child was not due until some two months later,
at the end of March.

Putting the time of conception, in the

mind of the Plaintiff GARY EGAN at least, safely back during
the time the parties were living together in wedlock. (Ex. P-ll)
When the Court views the statements made and the behavior
of the Defendant NANCY LEE EGAN prior to September 19, 1974,
in light of all the surrounding circumstances, particularly
with respect to her statements and behavior on September 20,
1974 after the Decree was entered, it compels the reasonable
inference and irrefutable conclusion that when NANCY EGAN
told GARY there was no question but that the child was his,
that she knew precisely what she was doing and used it as
leverage to induce Plaintiff to execute the SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT; that the statements made by her were false and she knew
at the time she made the statements that she had insufficient
knowledge upon which to base her representations as to paternity.
Such willful and reckless disregard for the truth or the
sufficiency of her knowledge, while knowing the Plaintiff was
strictly relying on the truth of her statements, is precisely
the kind of "reckless" and wanton behavior described in Pace v.
Parrish to support a finding by the Court of actionable common law fraud.

In all fairness the Court can come to no other

conclusion.
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POINT VI
THE COURT SHOULD GRANT RELIEF FROM THE ENTIRE JUDGMENT AND
NOT JUST A PORTION THEREOF, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE DISSOLUTION OF THE MARRIAGE ITSELF; AS APPELLANT'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTES EXTRINSIC MISREPRESENTATION.
At time of trial the Lower Court was uncertain as to how
much relief should be granted.

Fortunately to this question

there is a quick and easy answer:

that is the Court must

vacate as much of the judgment as justice requires.

See,

Warren v. Dixon Ranch, 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741, 742 (1953);
McGavin v. McGavin, 27 Utah 2d 200, 494 P.2d 283 (1972) (concurring opinion of Ellett, J.J. at P. 284 P.2d); Valley Bank
& Trust v. Gerber, 526 P.2d 1121 (1974).

The case authority

in Utah is quite clear that the party seeking relief is only
entitled to relief from the application of the judgment with
respect to those issues that have not been previously litigated.

Here the distinction between "intrinsic" and "ex-

trinsic" facts, misrepresentation and misconduct comes into
play.

In the leading case of Glover v. Glover, 121 Utah 326,

242 P.2d 298 (1952), the Utah Supreme Court per Chief Justice
Wolf reversing the Lower Court held that if some act, misrepresentation or misconduct on the part of one party prevented the adverse party from exhibiting fully his case, by
fraud or deception, keeping him away from court or by a
"false promise of compromise" and for that reason there has
never been a real contest, then this is classified as extrinsic
misconduct and the injured party is entitled to relief from
judgment and to have his day in court on those issues.
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If on the other hand the fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct goes to some issue that has been litigated or upon
which a trial has been had, then it is denominated as "intrinsic" fraud or misconduct and the parties are not again
entitled to be heard on those issues.
Utah 2d 299, 373 P.2d 577 (1962).

Haner v. Haner, 13

The policy reason for

this concept is that a trial on an issue should put an end
to the controversy involving the issue, whereas if an individual by reason of the misconduct of his opponent is prevented from or relinquishes his opportunity to present some
issue to judicial determination, he has not had his day in
court or been afforded his right of "due process" of law on
those issues.

The Court's holding in the Glover case that

the aggrieved party was entitled to a new trial on all issues
not previously litigated was recently affirmed in Clissold
v, Clissold, 30 Utah 2d 430, 519 P.2d 241 (1974).

Justice

Crockett suggested the Rule was even less restrictive in the
Haner case, supra, where he commented:
"It is sometimes said that when a judgment is
attacked collaterally on the ground that it was
obtained by fraud or deceit it will be set aside
only for extrinsic fraud. But we are in accord
with the indications in the Restatement of Judgments that this is too limited. It seems more
realistic to say that when it appears that the
processes of justice have been so completely
thwarted or distorted as to persuade the court
that in fairness and good conscience the judgment
should not be permitted to stand, relief should
be granted. . . . Inasmuch as the parties and
their witnesses were present and these issues were
contested during the trial, if there were in fact
misrepresentations and fraud, as plaintiff claims,
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they would have occurred within the trial itself (thus intrinsic to it) and therefore would
not have been of the type of fraud characterized
as extrinsic fraud, explained above." (Id. at
13 Utah 2d 300.)
Applying the law to the facts of the present case, the
Plaintiff GARY EGAN was induced by NANCY 1 s representations
to sign both a STIPULATION & SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT and a WAIVER,
APPEARANCE & CONSENT TO DEFAULT; laboring at the time under
the belief he had a legal and moral responsibility to support his wife and children, all such representations and
events took place outside the court room.
sentations had the effect of keeping

NANCY's repre-

GARY outside of court

as under the facts as represented to him there was no question
or contest as to paternity.

Had the misrepresentations not

been made, no AGREEMENT to support nor CONSENT TO DEFAULT
would have been entered and GARY would have had his day in
Court.

Because of the misrepresentations of fact made to

him by NANCY he waived his right to appear and litigate
and no trial was had on any issue.
Fed. 2d 774 (1952).

Dausuel v. Dausuel, 195

It does not seem to advance the cause

of justice to hold that if a party can use the Court as an
instrumentality of her fraud, then the injured party is barred
forever from using the Court in seeking redress.

If this

were the case one would not seek judicial resolution of disputes but assiduously avoid it.

No trial or hearing was ever

had upon the merits of this claim and all issues contained in
the Judgment and Decree of September 19, 1974 came in via Stipulation and Settlement Agreement and therefore went uncontested.
In light of the surrounding facts and the nature of the misrepresentations, GARY EGAN is entitled to relief from the

entire economic portion of judgment as a matter of law*
Clissold v. Clissold, supra, and Glover v. Glover, supra,
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO PAY HOSPITAL
EXPENSES INCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH THE BIRTH OF THE CHILD
AND EXPERT WITNESS FEES INCURRED IN CONNECTION WITH BLOOD
TESTS INTRODUCED AT TRIAL PROVING THE CHILD WAS NOT HIS.
1.

The hospital expenses cannot possibly be determined

to be family expenses.
The Trial Court erred in refusing to relieve GARY EGAN
from payment of the $900.00 in hospital expenses incurred
in connection with the birth of the child Melinda.

The Court

admittedly has some discretion here, but the Trial Court
specifically found, and the reason it gave for failure to grant
relief was that the hospital expenses incurred for the birth
of the child were "family expenses".
The Court's conclusion totally overlooks the fact that
the child was not GARY EGAN's child and therefore not an
expense of his family nor were such expenses incurred during
the marriage.
Section 30-2-9 Utah Code Annotated (2dRepl.Vol.3,1976) states:
FAMILY EXPENSES—JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY.—
The expenses of the family and the education of
the children are chargeable upon the property of
both husband and wife or of either of them, and
in relation thereto they may be sued jointly or
separately.
However Section 30-2-5 Utah Code Annotated

(2dRepl.Vol.3

1976) states:
SEPARATE DEBTS BEFORE AND AFTER MARRIAGE.—Neither
husband nor wife is liable for the debts or liabilities
-37-

of the other incurred before marriage, and,
except as herein otherwise declared, they are
not- liable for the debts of each other contracted
after marriage; nor are the wages, earnings or
property of either, or the rents or income of
the property of either, liable for the separate
debts of the other. (Emphasis added)
The divorce became final and absolute upon entry of the
Decree (R.6).

Since the Decree was entered on September 19,

1974 (R.12) and since the hospital expenses were not incurred
until March 2 8, 19 75, long after the marriage had been dissolved,
the hospital expenses cannot possibly be legally determined
to be a "family expense".
2.

The Trial Court erred in failing to grant the

Plaintiff his expert witness costs in proving true paternity.
Although the Trial Court ordered three separate and
independent blood tests to be used in connection with the
proof of paternity at time of trial, (R.24,70,72) and though
the Plaintiff GARY EGAN prevailed on the issue of paternity
at trial (R.134 114) , the Court refused to grant Respondent
his costs incurred for blood group examination and expert
witness fees to prove paternity at time of trial. (R.157).
§§ 78-25-18, et. seg., Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1975)
Utah's Evidence Code on Blood Tests in Civil Suits where
paternity if a factor reads as follows:
78-25-18. BLOOD TESTS FOR CHILD AND ALLEGED PARENTS
IN CIVIL ACTION AND BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH
PARENTAGE IS A RELEVANT FACT.—In any civil action
or in bastardy proceedings in which the parentage
of a person is a relevant fact, the court shall order
the child and alleged parents to submit to blood tests.
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78-25-19. BLOOD TEST—WHO TO MAKE.--The test
may be made by no more than three qualified
examiners of blood types, not restricted to
physicians, who shall be appointed by the
court . . .
78-25-20. EXAMINER AS WITNESS.—The court shall
call the examiner as a witness to testify to his
findings, and the examiner is subject to crossexamination by the parties . . .
78-25-21. ADMISSIBILITY OF RESULTS IN EVIDENCE.—The results of the tests shall be received in evidence where the conclusion of all
examiners, as disclosed by the tests, is that
the alleged father is not the actual father of
the child, and the question of paternity shall
be so resolved. . . .
78-25-23. COSTS OF EXAMINATION.--The court
shall determine the reasonable compensation to
be paid to an examiner appointed by the court,
and, in its discretion, may order that the parties
pay the costs in such proportions as it shall
prescribe . . .
As described above, the Court ordered two blood group
analyses pursuant to Plaintiff's motion, both of which
positively excluded Plaintiff from possible paternity.
The Plaintiff incurred expenses in the sum of $801.50 in
connection with these tests.

(See Memorandum of Costs and

Disbursements, R.169)
Originally the Court granted these costs to Plaintiff
GARY EGAN (R.139)(169), then later on motion of the Defendant NANCY EGAN, the Court reduced the award by $795.00.
Unquestionably, the Court has a certain degree of
discretion in awarding costs, but in the case at Bar, the
Court was not concerned with the attendant equities, but
expressed concern with the Defendant's ability to pay costs.
Such a finding constitutes an abuse of discretion as the
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respective party's ability to pay should never enter into
the question of whether a party is entitled to judgment.
Elsewise General Motors could never be awarded a judgment.
On appeal, the Cross Appellant seeks an order from
this Court directing the Trial Court to grant further relief from judgment which presently orders him to pay $900.00
in hospital bills for Melinda Egan and $795-00 in expert
(blood test) witness costs.
POINT VIII
GARY EGAN IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AGAINST NANCY EGAN FOR ALL
DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY HIM RESULTING FROM HER INCORRECT STATEMENTS.
The Trial Court denied recovery of compensatory damages
to GARY EGAN on grounds that the injuries complained of occurred during the marriage and that in Utcih a husband may
not recover damages from his wife (R.136 117). The Court
missed the fact that the money was paid to NANCY after the
divorce had become final.

As the Court granted partial

rescission from the Settlement Agreement it would follow
that Plaintiff would be entitled to restitution of all
monies paid pursuant to the Agreement before it was rescinded•
This is provided by § 30-2-6 Utah Code Annotated (Repl. Vol.
3, 1976), which reads as follows:
ACTIONS BASED ON PROPERTY RIGHTS.—Should the
husband or wife obtain possession or control
of property belonging to the other before or
after marriage the owner of the property may
maintain an action therefor, or for any right
growing out of the same/ in the same manner
and to the same extent as if they were un~
married.
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The Cross Appellant is aware of the case of Rubalcaua
v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963), but submits that case is totally in inapposite to the case at Bar.
The Supreme Court should overrule the Trial Court's finding
that the doctrine of Intra Family Immunity applies in the
case at Bar by virtue of the Utah Married Woman's Act
§ 30-2-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated (1953) and because
the parties were not married when the injury occurred.
Plaintiff is legally entitled to restitution from NANCY
for the money paid prior to rescission of the Settlement
Agreement.
POINT IX
TO REQUIRE GARY EGAN TO PAY SUPPORT FOR A CHILD JUDICIALLY
PROVED NOT TO BE HIS WOULD CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
The only time that the issue of paternity was litigated in an adversarial hearing was when Plaintiff brought
his Rule 60(b) action for relief from judgment.

At that

hearing the evidence was conclusive and uncontroverted that
the child Melinda was not GARY'S child.

To require GARY

EGAN to pay further support for this child would violate
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States.

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S. Ct. 251, 30 L.

Ed.2d 225 (1971); Fronteiro v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 671,
93 S. Ct. 1764, 36 L. Ed.2d 583 (1973); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940.
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CONCLUSION
The case before the Court on Appeal is not one where the
parties are bitterly attempting to vindicate their emotional
injuries or assuage damaged egos at the children's expense.
This case is simply one where a dutiful estranged husband
acted over zealously in his attempts to save his marriage by
conciliating his wife in a Settlement Agreement in hopes of
ultimate reconciliation.

Without question he acted impru-

dently in signing an Agreement to pay hospital bills and
child support for his wife's expected child; but it does not
seem unreasonable that in his then present frame of mind
that he would be reticent to charge his wife with adultery
or reluctant to go into Court to contest the legitimacy of
her child, when all the while she assured him that the child
she was carrying was his child, and when he had no reason
to doubt her.

After NANCY gave birth to a child from whose

physical appearance GARY obviously could not have fathered,
GARY acted promptly to correct his error.

As the child was

not born until some six months after the Divorce Decree was
entered, there was no reasonable way that GARY could have
determined paternity prior to birth; as no one would suggest
endangering the mother or child with prenatal blood tests
before the child was born.
The Respondent simply cannot conceive that it would be
fair or just for the Court to order him to pay $27,000.00 to
support another man's child.

The Trial Court also

believed that Equity and Justice would be better served
if GARY were released from the future applica-
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tion of the support judgment and set that portion of the
Decree aside.

Presumably, NANCY can seek support of her

child from the child's natural father, the man who justly
should support the child.
On cross appeal, it would seem here that the Trial
Court was too generous and too compassionate with NANCY in
allowing all other terms of the Divorce Decree to stand.
Those issues were never litigated and are not res adjudicata.
The Settlement Agreement and Decree were unquestionably
based entirely upon false premises that NANCY had been a
true and faithful wife and that GARY had both a legal and
moral obligation to

support his family.

Surely had GARY

been advised of the true state of the facts and the real
reason why his wife was leaving him, he would not have
struck such an unconscionable bargain.

Because NANCY was

able to use the Court as an instrument of her misrepresentation should not, in all good conscience, preclude forever a remedy from the wrong.

The Case should now be re-

ferred to the Domestic Relations Division for a hearing on
the merits of the case with all parties now fully understanding the true facts.
Finally, the Court on equitable review should overrule
the Trial Court f s failure to relieve GARY from $900.00 in
hospital bills, $795.00 in expert witness fees and order
restitution to GARY of the $1,800.00 paid to date to NANCY
for the support of Melinda.

If the law is to be a means to
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achieve justice and not merely a mechanism to serve itself,
then justice must be done between the parbies and GARY EGAN
must be fully relieved from a Divorce Decree never before
litigated and based entirely upon
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